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Abstract 
 
This study explores volatility smiles when stock market information is lagged, 
specifically in the REIT industry. A usual requirement is that REITs can only 
disseminate information relating to their property valuations once per year; therefore, 
this leads to the lagging effect. Within the context of exchange options (i.e. mergers), 
it seems that no study has researched on this theme. This article uses the Black & 
Scholes model to calculate implied volatilities and their corresponding implied 
options to illustrate arbitrage opportunities when exchange options emerge. The 
results illustrate that implied volatilities are different from non-implied volatilities. 
Further, arbitrage is still higher among REITs as opposed to other capital market 
instruments. Finally, just like other capital market instruments, REIT acquisitions 
generate alpha. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
This article explores implied volatilities of exchange option. Exchange option occurs when 
merger and acquisition (M&A) deal is executed. The black-Scholes (1973) (from here B-S) model 
irrespective of the type of options, used to price transactions that are specifically cash-financed 
(see; Black and Scholes 1973, Barraclough et al. 2013 and Sebehela 2015). Furthermore, they 
stated that shareholders of a firm have an option in the form of common stocks that can either 
be callable or puttable. The B-S model is not industry-specific, hence its elegance in option 
pricing. In a no-basic arbitrage, investors would not be able to make extra profits other than 
profits that are due to them. However, given that stock markets are not always efficient, some 
investors do profit for stock market inefficiencies. One of the ways of finding out whether there 
is arbitrage within option pricing framework is by calculating implied volatilities. Implied 
volatilities illustrate ideal options when basic no-arbitrage principle holds. 
 
Ideally, the volatility smiles should give rise to exchange option smile. Normally, academics 
and/or practitioners calculate smiles because stock prices diverted from the normal curves. In the 
context of an exchange option, share prices, 𝑃 of acquiring and target firms in relation to their 
fundamental prices, 𝑃∗ during acquisitions. One of the reasons why share and fundamental prices 
would diverge from each other within acquisitions framework would be when there is an “extra” 
value emanating from merger synergies. Normally, when the acquiring firm merges with target 
firm when stock markets are efficient it is expected that the option price represents the extra 
value for the target firm and “loss” for acquiring firm. More formally, if 𝑡 + 1 being the deal 
announcement date, then 𝑃𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔,𝑡 and 𝑃𝐴𝑐𝑞,𝑡 represent the closing price of the target and 
acquiring company respectively at time 𝑡. If the option price at time 𝑡 is denoted by 𝑂𝑃𝑡 then 
ceteris paribus, the theoretical price for the target and acquiring firms to be computed as follows: 
 
𝑃𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔,𝑡+1
∗ = 𝑃𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔,𝑡 + 𝑂𝑃𝑡     (1) 
𝑃𝐴𝑐𝑞,𝑡+1
∗ = 𝑃𝐴𝑐𝑞,𝑡 − 𝑂𝑃𝑡     (2) 
 
Since the announcement of the acquisition deal will make the shareholder of the acquiring firm 
suffer from a drop in price by 𝑂𝑃𝑡, this amount should represent the fair price paid by the 
acquirer to access an extra value created by the merged entity. Given that the option price will 
always be at least equal to zero, it is expected that: 
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𝑃𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔,𝑡+1
∗ ≥ 𝑃𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔,𝑡      (3) 
𝑃𝐴𝑐𝑞,𝑡+1
∗ ≤ 𝑃𝐴𝑐𝑞,𝑡      (4) 
 
At the same time, it is known that the effective closing prices after the announcement will adjust 
to a level that may be different from the theoretical one: 
 
𝑃𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔,𝑡+1
∗ ≠ 𝑃𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔,𝑡+1      (5) 
𝑃𝐴𝑐𝑞,𝑡+1
∗ ≠ 𝑃𝐴𝑐𝑞,𝑡+1      (6) 
 
Past studies on diversion of share and fundamental prices cite different factors that cause 
diversion including options parameters, information asymmetry, momentum of share prices, 
assets valuations that underpin both share and options prices (see Glascock and Hung 2010). 
However, if acquisition leads to synergies due to arbitrage opportunities then equations (1) to (4) 
should not hold. One of the ways that arbitrage can be explained as follows, when the calculated 
option value is zero, then that deal should not be executed as it is invaluable and in the case 
where the option value is more than zero, the predator should not pay more the option amount; 
otherwise, there is an overpayment. Therefore, the difference between exercise and option price 
is arbitrage. 
 
Academics and/or practitioners calculate implied volatilities, typically the equate observed option 
prices of the B-S theoretical prices, then solve for unknown volatility parameter, given 
information on option contracts and underlying asset prices. When such situation arises, intraday 
investors (i.e. trades) an advantage of such environment in several ways including using non-
linear and moments techniques (see Jones 2003). In this article, data is on the U.S. real estate 
investment trust (REIT) industry because; (i) the U.S. has the biggest REIT industry in the world, 
(ii) the U.S. is the first country in the world that passed REIT legislation in 1965, (iii) REITs are 
unique securities because they trade like shares while they are in fact units, (iv) unlike other 
capital market instruments, REITs are only allowed to disseminate information on their 
underlying assets once per financial year. The latter statement supports the notion that 
information captured by share prices of REITs is lagged. On the other hand, real estate 
appraisers can misprice property values, i.e. in the UK appraiser can misprice property values by 
20%. That is, information asymmetry due to lagging effect and mispricing is relatively high in 
REITs than any capital market instrument. Most studies that explored volatility smiles focus on 
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currencies, commodities, fixed income securities and equities. To our knowledge, this is the first 
article that explores volatility smiles in the REIT industry. 
 
The latter paragraph puts forward several questions including, are REIT volatility smiles 
differently to other capital market instruments; what about options calculated based on implied 
volatilities, especially implied exchange options. It seems that this is the first article that volatility 
smiles of exchange options in the REIT industry. Further, what are risk and return patterns in 
this case and finally do arbitrage opportunities lead to synergies? The contribution of this article 
is exactly answering those listed questions. One can infer from prior studies on volatility smiles 
that there are synergies (see Jones 2003 and Bayer et al. 2016). The risk is this article is measured 
with volatility. Although, volatility has is not a coherent risk measure such as expected short fall, 
but volatility is probably the best measure when one disaggregates risk pattern over a longer 
period (see Campbell et al. 2001). The results of this study illustrate that volatility smiles 
symbolizes the presence of arbitrage opportunities. Although the lagging effect is undesirable to 
most stock market participants, its presence in the REIT industry is beneficial, i.e. increase 
arbitrage which leads to higher option premium. The risk and return outcomes support what has 
been presented earlier, i.e. REIT mergers have diversification benefits. Similarly, to other 
industries mergers, REIT mergers generate alpha. 
 
The rest of the article is organized as follows: section two is on literature review, section three is 
on general pricing, section four is on empirical analysis and the last section concludes the article. 
 
 
2.  Literature Review 
 
The literature review for this article is divided in two sections; (i) volatility smiles as the article is 
shaped around volatility smiles subject area, (ii) implied options as this article is pricing implied 
exchange options, and (iii) variance swaps, as they volatility products, normally priced in an ideal 
environment. On the other hand, the second option explores how implied options are different 
from non-implied options. 
 
2.1  Volatility Smiles 
Hobson and Rogers (1998) presents different models when the volatility is stochastic. They argue 
that traded options are inconsistent with a constant volatility assumption. In presenting models, 
 4 
Hobson and Rogers (1998) start with non-constant volatility (NCV) models. Central to NCV 
models is that their volatility is dependent on stochastic process. Some of the processes that they 
put forward include constant elasticity of variance (CEV) and exponential Brownian motion 
(eBM). In those models, Hobson and Rogers (1998) state that prior studies illustrate that implied 
volatilities vary with changes in strike prices. Then, they present GARCH models, especially 
GARCH(1;1) model. The elegance of GARCH models is that they allow arbitrary past 
conditional variances and residuals. To do away with the shortcomings of the two groups of 
models, they expressed ‘instantaneous volatility in terms of weighted moments of the historic 
log-price’. The pricing of options in Hobson and Rogers (1998) was centered on European 
contingent claim. The results illustrate that implied volatility are convenient when pricing 
securities across different security payoffs. They argue that if the non-constant term has 
increasing implied volatility, then initial offset is nonzero, and the option is not at-the-money.as 
expected, when implied volatility is high, so are option prices. 
 
Gonçalves and Guildolin (2006) illustrate volatility dynamism on the S&P500 (SPX) index. At 
heart of their study, is how the implied volatility surface (IVS) over time to expiration. This is 
because implied volatilities vary systematically with the option price and time to expiration. Other 
than contributing to purely modelling volatility surface, Gonçalves and Guildolin (2006) went 
further and explored time-series dimension. The main question time variation in the IVS, are 
there any gains in that situation? To answer that question, Gonçalves and Guildolin (2006) 
adopted application of vector auto-regression (VAR) models as illustrated in Dumas et al. 19985. 
Although, there was data was lagged in their study, it was not due to information being dispersed 
into the market once per financial year, a common phenomenon in the REIT industry. Case et al. 
2012 stated the same phenomenon in the REIT industry. 
 
The data used is from Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) on the SPX index options 
(calls and puts) covering the period of January 3, 1992-June 28, 1996. Gonçalves and Guildolin 
(2006) state that SPX options are European-style and expire the third Friday of each calendar 
month. Some data was not taken into account due to (i) thinly traded options (i.e. arbitrary cut-
off chosen at 100 contracts per day), (ii) options that violate basic no-arbitrage conditions, (iii) 
discard data with fewer than six trading days to maturity, (iv) absolute excess moneyness of 10% 
and (v) exclude options with lower than 
$3
8
 to mitigate against discreteness on the IVS structure. 
The results show that implied volatilities are heterogeneous over time to expiration. For fitting 
                                                          
5 More on the VAR model see; Dumas B, Fleming J and Whaley R (1998). Implied Volatility Functions: Empirical Tests. Journal of 
Finance, 53(6), 2059-2106. 
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the implied volatility surface, results exemplify that a close relationship between raw and implied 
volatilities. They went further and modelled dynamics of implied volatility surface, using VAR 
and ordinary least squares (OLSs). The results were consistent with prior results in the Gonçalves 
and Guildolin (2006). When estimating VAR models on cross-sectional OLS estimates, the 
results were close to the multivariate model as opposed to Dumas et al. 1998.  
 
To strengthen their results, Gonçalves and Guildolin (2006) did a predictability test on the out-
sample data. Data used for this section is from January 1, 1992-December 31, 1992; January 1, 
1992-December 31, 1993 and so on until January 1, 1992-December 31, 1995. The results show 
that still show that, the multivariate model performs better than Dumas et al. 1998. The 
difference was small in absolute terms. The prediction errors decrease as the time to expiration 
approaches maturity. More, they tested the economic analysis based on different trading 
strategies; (i) A: trading strategies and rate of return calculations, (ii) B: trading profits before 
transaction costs, and (iii) C: trading profits after transaction costs. Trading strategies A and B 
achieved highest mean percentage profits and Sharpe ratios. And transaction costs eroded trading 
profits. Finally, the robustness test supports the notion that results are robust. 
 
2.2  Implied Exchange Options 
Empirical studies estimated implied volatilities of exchange options can be traced far back as 
1987, i.e. Bhagat et al. 1987. Sorwar and Sudarsanam (2010) explored option pricing within M&A 
framework and it is “shaped” around Bhagat et al. 1987. This empirical study adopts similar 
option pricing principles to Bhagat et al. 1987, and Sorwar and Sudarsanma (2010) but it is 
different in the sense it explores M&A synergies in the U.S. REIT industry.  
 
One thing that comes out of Bhagat et al. 1987 is that option pricing on M&A captures more 
parameters such as information asymmetry when compared with CAPM. Option pricing model 
used in Bhagat et al. 1987 is the B-S model because exchange options are cash financed. The 
exact specifications of the B-S model including parameters used in Bhagat et al. 1987 will be 
explained later in the methodology part. The sample of Bhagat et al. 1987 is made up of tender 
offers over the period of July 1962 to December 1980 and the (+150;-21) window is used to 
analyze M&A deals. Besides actual calculated options values and synergies, options techniques 
according to Bhagat et al. 1987 predict on how stocks portfolios and their risks behave. After the 
acquiring firm has declared its intention to take over the target firm, the predator exercise its call 
to enter the M&A deal while target firm exercise its put when it accepts the offer. Hackbarth and 
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Morellec (2008) echoed similar sentiments on acquiring firm declaring its intention to take over 
the target firm. Results illustrated that implied options show synergies emanating from exchange 
options; in addition, risks and returns measures confirm what is illustrated by options.  
 
Sorwar and Sudarsanam (2010) is shaped around Bhagat et al. 1987 except that some principles 
and/or parameters were improved from the earlier empirical study. Among parameters improved 
include acceptable of convergence limit of (𝑃 − 𝑃𝑠 − 𝐹𝑃𝑝)
2
≤ 0.01 versus convergence limit of 
(𝑃 − 𝑃𝑠 − 𝐹𝑃𝑝)
2
≤ 0.0625 in Bhagat et al. 1987, where 𝑃 is the offer price, 𝑃𝑠 is the underlying 
stock price and 𝐹𝑃𝑝 is the factional put (i.e. put amount which is percentage of target firm 
common stocks that will be taken over by acquirer). That formula for calculating implied 
volatilities and options will be discussed in detail in general pricing section of this article. Other 
thing that improves Sorwar and Sudarsanam (2010) in relation to Bhagat et al. 1987 is that the 
former theoretically and empirically illustrated takeover value of target firms and bid premiums. 
In addition, Sorwar and Sudarsanam (2010) illustrated that some puts show wealth transfer to 
target firms especially in cases where shareholders of target firms were overcompensated. The 
process where some target firms are overcompensated while other undercompensated within 
option pricing framework illustrates dynamic pricing when there are multiple factors driving 
option values. Dynamism within M&A based on option pricing can be traced back to early 2000s. 
Dynamism in this context means merging and/or comparing option pricing within pricing 
techniques from other disciplines (see Subramanian 2004). 
 
2.3  Implied Non-Exchange Options  
The crux of Subramanian (2004) was on developing an arbitrage free model within complete 
market to price options emanating from mergers. Although, Subramanian (2004) agrees that the 
B-S model is appropriate in pricing cash financed deals, but he questions its validity when there is 
continuous diffusion. In developing the arbitrage free model, Subramanian (2004) stated that 
stock prices movements can be illustrated by stochastic differential equation (SDE). Thereafter, 
he expanded his model to include jumps depending on deals and portion of common stock taken 
over from target firm by acquirer. The stochastic process was driven by more than one stock 
price and evolution of M&A dates were captured. To validate his model, he derived an Ito 
formula of that model. Conceptually, the arbitrage free model and Ito Lemma confirm similar 
views, that stock prices movements are stochastic, and the processes respond differently to M&A 
dates (i.e. announcement and completion). The results calculated under complete markets 
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illustrate that arbitrage free model captures more about M&A deal when stock prices are 
discontinuous and stock jumps are modelled accordingly. 
 
The elegance of Barraclough et al. 2013 can be found in the fact other than basing their 
methodology on prior studies, Barraclough et al. 2013 expand option pricing on M&As such that 
things like M&As announcements are captured in the model, likelihood of competing acquirer 
emerging in bidding for a target firm and disentangled gains of bidders and preys. Barraclough et 
al. 2013 used option pricing to explore overpayments in M&As and questioned if those 
overpayments are due to synergies or not. The interesting thing about Barraclough et al. 2013 is 
that it combines asset pricing and option pricing to illustrated synergies. That is, they used a 
similar “linear” regression that incorporates options (i.e. put and calls) and prices (i.e. acquirer 
and target) to illustrated cases of overpayments and to whom those synergies accrue to. 
Moreover, Barraclough et al. 2013 considered probabilities of failure and success of M&As deals. 
In Barraclough et al. 2013, some M&As deals were hostile and others friendly, and some deals 
were called off (i.e. both hostile and friendly deals). Irrespective of the type of M&As deal, results 
of Barraclough et al. 2013 illustrate that there are synergies on average which justified premium 
payments made to target firms in M&As. They went further and tested the likelihood using 
logistic model, and results of logistic model confirmed similar results to options analysis. 
Moreover, logistic model illustrated that effective premium and relative size are statistically 
significant in determining synergies in M&As. 
 
Grullon et al. 2012 explored the positive relation between stock returns of firms and their 
volatilities within the real options framework. The key factors that were used as parameters of 
illustrate extra value are volatility, return-volatility relationship, convexity, flexibility, asset pricing 
techniques such as ARs and Fama-French (1993) three factor model. One of the main points that 
they put forward was that market returns and market volatility are negatively related to each 
other, although options values are positively related to market volatilities. Among reasons cited as 
casual of negative relationship between market returns and volatility is the presence of leverage. 
However, prior empirical studies such as Graham (1996) illustrated that debt increase options 
values because of volatility increases with debt increases.  
 
Hypotheses tested by Grullon et al. 2012 were first, is there any value in firms that have 
abundance of investment opportunities; second, what is the impact of new information on 
options values of firms; third, sensitivity of volatilities on changes in growth options and assets 
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values over time; fourth, return-volatility relationship when there are plenty growth and strategic 
opportunities; finally, volatility-return in relation to asset pricing models’ performance. Daily data 
used by Grullon et al. 2012 is from CRSP over the period of January 1964 to December 2008. 
Measures used to calculate investment opportunities are firm size, R&D expenditures and sales 
growth. Measures of investment and financing spikes are from COMPUSTAT. 
 
Results from Grullon et al. 2012 illustrate that first, when there are abundant investment 
opportunities and the firms pays attention to timing of investments; then options values increase; 
second, real options capture information better than CAPM but CAPM cannot be ruled out 
especially when there is weak return-volatility relationship; third, options values, growth options 
in their case are sensitive to volatility changes and proper mitigation of volatility changes increase 
options values; fourth, volatility-return relationship is stronger in industries that exhibit plenty of 
growth and strategic opportunities, i.e. high-tech, pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries. 
Finally, in the presence of real options, CAPM explains underlying assets returns but no equity 
returns as equity returns are captured by real options model. All articles that have explored 
implied options are not on the REIT industry; this study explores implied volatilities and/or 
options in the REIT industry. To our knowledge, this is the first article that illustrates implied 
options and/or volatilities in the REIT industry. 
 
2.4  Variance Swap 
Cont and Kokholm (2013) modelled volatility smiles on a range of derivatives products including 
SPX and CBOE volatility index, simply known as VIX. They argue that volatility index gained 
popularity because of hedging reasons. It can be inferred from Cont and Kokholm (2013) that 
one of the reasons for pricing volatility surface in the context of variance products is because one 
wants to price those products in a consistent manner. Although, multifactor stochastic volatility 
(MSV) models can deal with some of the problems of pricing in a consistent manner; however, 
MSV models are incapable on features of the data as the magnitude of the VIX option skewness. 
In their pricing, they explore variance swaps, forward variance swap rates and options on forward 
variance swaps. In modelling dynamics of variance swaps and the underlying index of the model, 
Cont and Kokholm (2013) focused on variance swap dynamics, dynamics of underlying asset, 
vanilla options, and parametric processes; (i) Gaussian jumps, and (ii) exponential distributed 
jumps. 
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The data used in Cont and Kokholm (2013) is from August 20, 2008 on a range of VIX put and 
call options for five maturities. The data is from CBOE and options with bids of zero are 
removed. The results of Cont and Kokholm (2013) illustrate those model specifications are 
achievable with very low calibration error. Further, implied prices fall within almost all bid-ask 
spread. Double exponential jumps are slightly better when compared with the first interval, but 
performance is independent of the ‘choice of the jump size distribution’. The two specifications 
had similar goodness of fit. In addition, sensitivity is not influenced by model type. 
 
Bayer at al. 2016 priced volatility smiles under rough environment for realized variance products. 
Given that Bayer et al. 2016 based their sample on SPX, in this article, the environment is much 
“rougher” than in Bayer at al. 2016 because the analysis is on REITs and information in the 
REIT industry is characterised by lagging effect and real estate industry is broadly more 
asymmetry than equities market. They specifically focused on pricing a daily logarithmic realized 
variance. For the pricing environment, Bayer at al. 2016 proposed rough fractional stochastic 
volatility (RFSV) model. They argue that the orientation of volatility surface changes over time 
but not the overall volatility surface. At crux of their study is that uncertain integrated variance 
over time to expiration should generate different implied volatilities. 
 
The pricing in Bayer at al. 2016 was shaped around the change of measure. This includes pricing 
under a ℚ measure. Models used in Black-Scholes and rough Bergomi (rBergomi). First, the 
simulated the rBergomi such that they construct joint variance for the Volterra process ?̃? and 
Brownian motion 𝑍. They find that volatility surface of rBergomi is close to SPX volatility 
surface, although, simulation of rBergomi are slow. Then, they estimate the curve for variance 
swap based on two dates; (i) February 4, 2010 and (ii) August 14, 2013. Bayer et al. 2016 claim 
that jumps are required to smiles of short periods indeed. Given that windows used this article 
are just for a few months, one hopes that smiles will be well captured. The results illustrate that 
the study by Bayer et al. 2016 show accurate prediction of volatility surface for high-frequency 
price data. 
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3.  General Pricing 
 
3.1  Portfolio Behaviour During Tender Period 
In illustrating results of event studies, windows are chosen arbitrarily (see Bhagat et al. 1987, 
Sorwar and Sudarsanam 2010, and Kinateder et al. 2017). Bhagat et al. 1987, and Sorwar and 
Sudarsanam (2010) used (+150;-21) window. Sebehela (2015) illustrated that longer windows are 
ideal when illustrate risks and returns. This article defines interval as consisting of 300-days pre-
tender period and 32-days post M&A announcement, (+300;-32) window. The 300-days pre-
tender period is suitable for illustrating various parameters when there is so much information 
asymmetry and the cut off 32-days post-merger, is because due to data limitations, the transaction 
with shortest post data runs up to 32 days. In the REIT industry, properties illiquid which partly 
contribute to semi-strong efficient market hypothesis. In terms of the intensity of information, 
most intensity is found on target firms (see Sorwar and Sudarsanam 2010). Normally, market and 
stock risks are high pre-M&A announcement but decrease towards M&A completion period 
while returns are initially lower but increase post-M&A completion. As firms announce their 
intention to merge, new information spillover to the market participants and that leads to risks 
decreasing post-M&A announcement when compared to pre-offer period. Moreover, Dann et al. 
1991 stated that if there are diversification benefits, risks should continue to decrease until M&A 
is completed. On the other hand, Sorwar and Sudarsanam (2010) stated that the decrease pattern 
of risks and increasing returns during M&A expiration period illustrate merging synergies.  
 
3.2  Implied Volatilities and Options 
Bhagat et al. 1987, and Sorwar and Sudarsanam (2010) are a few studies that priced exchange 
options in equities markets. Therefore, in estimating implied volatilities, this article will draw 
estimation techniques from Bhagat et al. 1987, and Sorwar and Sudarsanam (2010). The 
maximum options payoff illustrates the amount that option pays when it is in-the-money 
position. As stated in the introduction section, the B-S model is used to price cash-financed 
transactions. The put option of the B-S model is presented as follows: 
 
𝑝 = 𝑋𝑒−𝑟𝜏𝑁(−𝑑2) − 𝑆0(−𝑑1)    (7) 
with: 
𝑑1 =
𝑙𝑛(
𝑆0
𝐾
)+(𝑟+
𝜎2
2
)𝜏
𝜎√𝑇
      (8) 
𝑑2 = 𝑑1 − 𝜎√𝜏      (9) 
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where 𝑝 is the put option, 𝑆0 is the spot price (i.e., target price), 𝑋 is the exercise price (i.e. the 
deal value per share which SNL Financial calculates as amount paid for target acquisition over 
shares used to calculate deal, those shares include ordinary shares and operating units 
outstanding) and the exercise price in every M&A deal for the entire time to expiration, 𝑟 is the 
continuous risk-free interest rate, 𝜏 is tau and it remaining days to the end of offer period, 𝜎 is 
the volatility of the stock, 𝑑1 and 𝑑2 are probabilities of being in-the-money, and 𝑁(𝑑1) and 
𝑁(𝑑2) are univariate cumulative normal density functions with upper integral limits 𝑑1 and 𝑑2 
respectively. The volatility of target firm is estimated based on its historical prices as historical 
volatilities are model free. In the B-S model, the iteration process is used to estimate underlying 
stock value, implied volatilities of stocks and option values. Like Bhagat et al. 1987 and Sorwar 
and Sudarsanam (2010), it is assumed that 𝑃 is observable price, 𝑃𝑠 is unobservable price and 𝐹𝑃𝑝 
is a fractional put. The faction of the exchange F may be any number between zero and one, 
(0 < 𝐹 ≤ 1), and in this empirical study exchange F is 1.00 for all cash-financed transactions. 
Bhagat et al. 1987 and Sorwar and Sudarsanam (2010) illustrated that the equation illustrating the 
formula made up of 𝑃, 𝑃𝑠 and 𝐹𝑃𝑝 is: 
 
𝑃 = 𝑃𝑠 + 𝐹𝑃𝑝      (10) 
 
Just like Bhagat et al. 1987, and Sorwar and Sudarsanam (2010), it is assumed that in equation (9) 
the stock price of underlying asset and its volatility are unobservable. The standard deviation is 
assumed to be constant over the offer period, for starting unobserved price 𝑃𝑠 of each M&A 
deal, we start with implied prices calculation on day 3 of offer period. The reason why the 
starting options calculations are on day +3 of offer period is because REIT share prices jumps 
are avoided although jumps in REITs are minimal. Sorwar and Sudarsanam (2010) started their 
calculations on day 2 of offer period; it seems that they did that in order to avoid effects of share 
prices jumps as they used non-real estate data for their analysis. Initial standard deviation is one 
estimated as from day +1. To solve for the price of underlying stock and/or to calculate implied 
volatilities, eq. (7) is re-stated as: 
 
𝑃𝑠 = 𝑃 − 𝐹𝑃𝑝      (11) 
 
For convergence the following equation should hold: 
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(𝑃 − 𝑃𝑠 − 𝐹𝑃𝑝)
2
≤ 0.03           (12) 
 
The square of equation (12) is minimised, adjusting 𝑃𝑠 and 𝜎 subject to a suitable tolerance limit. 
For each M&A deal, iteration process of this study allows that there should be at most hundred 
iterations and those iterations occur for every offer day until day maturity of each M&A deal. In 
eq. (12), the fraction 𝐹 is 1 while in Bhagat et al. 1987, and Sorwar and Sudarsanam (2010) 𝐹 
ranged between 0 and 1. The iteration process is subjected to “appropriate” tolerance limit. In 
this study, the tolerance limit is that estimated values should be within 3% of their starting values. 
That is, eq. (12) should converge when the option premium is calculated to the accuracy of three 
pence. The tolerance limit of Bhagat et al. 1987 is 6.25%, and Sorwar and Sudarsanam (2010) is 
1% of their starting values. Bhagat et al. 1987 choose their tolerance limit based on number 
trades that occur on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), and in Sorwar and Sudarsanam 
(2010) the tolerance limit was based on the fact that out of their sample, 79 firms had a fraction 
of one. 
 
This study wants to be closer to zero as minimising for zero is an ideal situation; however, given 
the fact that during 1994-2010 period, U.S. REITs declared at least 90% of their profits as 
dividends, the probabilities of options were at least in-the-money positions, and to date there are 
no options written on U.S. REITs; therefore, there are significant anomalies which disturb 
equation (13) from converging to zero. Bhagat et al. 1987, and Sorwar and Sudarsanam (2010) 
stated that dividends lead to anomalies which made them to exclude some of the M&A deals 
from their analysis. Bhagat et al. 1987 did highlight the problem of non-convergence due to 
options being in-the-money position but Sorwar and Sudarsanam (2010) did not explicitly stated 
problem of options being the in-the-money positions. In this empirical study, convergence of 
most M&A deals occurs within the first iteration. In Bhagat et al. 1987, convergence occurred 
within the first three iterations, and Sorwar and Sudarsanam (2010) did not state number of 
iterations needed for their model to converge. 
 
To avoid negative options and prices, a command is build that states stock prices should be 
positive (and options at least zero) as stock prices can never be less than zero. Similarly, implied 
option prices can never be less zero. In addition, option prices should be less than stock prices as 
this is consistent with reality. In Bhagat et al. 1987, and Sorwar and Sudarsanam (2010), implied 
stock prices, put options and volatilities are at least zero. In terms of testing whether implied 
standard deviations are acceptable, we adopted the same principles as Bhagat et al. 1987, and 
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Sorwar and Sudarsanam (2010). Bhagat et al. 1987 went further to test whether their calculated 
implied results are sensitive to their starting values by repeating the procedure using one half and 
twice their original starting values of 𝑃𝑠 and 𝜎. 
They found that in all cases except one, convergence is the same for those different starting 
values. Sorwar and Sudarsanam (2010) did not state whether they tested as per latter statement. 
The entire process is continued until starting and ending values are within acceptable levels. 
Using estimating process, standard deviations are calculated such that starting value are at same 
level as 50% level of significance, then the procedure is ended and estimated 𝑃𝑝, 𝑃𝑠 and 𝜎 are 
used. If the null hypothesis of chi-test is rejected at 50% level of significance, the entire 
procedure is re-starting all over again using the starting values of 𝜎, the estimated 𝜎 is from the 
derived series. The process is continued such that for chi-test starting and ending values of 𝜎 are 
not rejected at significance level of 50%. Similar assumptions are made by Bhagat et al. 1987 and 
Sorwar and Sudarsanam (2010). 
 
3.3  Measurements 
This section explores reasons for matching the sample and reasons on how and why ARs are 
used. The markets used in this empirical study are SPX and S&P600 small-cap. The rationale of 
using SPX is that it includes constituents from all or major U.S. sectors of the economy including 
REITs; moreover, SPX has been existence since 1975. Given that some of the merging firms are 
non-real estate firms; therefore, SPX offer a fair representation of the market of analysing 
merging firms including REITs. On the other hand, REITs are largely small-cap to mid-cap 
stocks in terms of size; therefore, SPX small-cap index illustrates a suitable market that 
encompasses REITs in terms of size. “The small capitalization index (SMALL) is not regularly 
employed in computing a firm’s beta; however, it is included due to research showing that REIT 
stocks behave similarly to small capitalization stocks”, Anderson et al. 2009. To illustrate 
abnormal performance of REITs in relation to the markets, CARs are used. CARs are mostly 
used in REIT events studies to illustrate whether accumulation or distribution due to occurrence 
of certain events. In calculating CARs, first, ARs which are difference between actual and 
expected returns are calculated. ARs are calculated on securities and markets. To get CARs, ARs 
of a security and a market are subtracted from each other over a given period. 
 
3.4  Data 
The sample is made up of 106 completed public-to-public U.S. M&A deals from SNL Financial. 
Cash finance deals make 38.68% (i.e. 41 deals); stocks financed make 47.17% (i.e. 50 deals) and 
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stocks and cash deals make 14.15% (15 deals) of the sample. The 41 deals are within sectors and 
they specialise in multi-family, office, self-storage, industrial, shopping centres, diversified, health 
care and hotels. Only cash financed deals are analysed. Some of the cash financed deals were left 
out for poor data quality reasons. From the final sample of 41 M&A deals, 2 deals were taken off 
because target firms had prices less than 32 days post M&A announcement although their time to 
expirations are more than 32 days post M&A announcement. Then, on the remaining 39 M&A 
deals, we calculated implied options for only 21 M&A deals as there is convergence problem on 
other M&A deals. In certain cases, some deals from the final sample, the acquiring firm merged 
with more than one target firm during the period of 1996 to 2009; therefore, all different 
transactions per one acquirer and different target firms will be analysed. Acquisitions rates in all 
cash-financed deals are 100% of target firms’ outstanding shares. In terms of funding size of the 
deal, deals are worth at least $52.58 million. Table 1 exemplifies cash deals sizes over M&A 
period. 
 
[ INSERT TABLE 1 HERE ] 
 
Most of REIT transactions fall within the small-caps and mid-caps categories6. The last subprime 
crisis occurred in 2008/2009; however, based GARCH (1;1), during periods of 1996-2009 and 
2008-2009, the U.S. REIT industry was in the bull market phase as spot volatilities converge to 
their long-term average volatilities from the top7. For each deal, SNL Financial lists only the 
M&A announcement and closing dates; therefore, it is assumed that all options are of European 
nature. The announcement date is decided in two ways, SNL Financial either takes the earliest 
event date as the announcement date or where there is letter of intent (LOI) dated prior to the 
definitive agreement date, SNL Financial registers the LOI date as the announcement date. The 
closure date is estimated by SNL Financial based on interviews with respective companies and 
should the actual date be different to one listed earlier on based on interviews, SNL Financial 
changes the date accordingly after deal completion. Therefore, only the modified date is 
observed. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
6 Mueller GR (1998). REIT Size and Earnings Growth: Is Bigger Better, or a New Challenge? Journal of Real Estate Portfolio Management, 
4(2),149-157. 
7 For further proof that the U.S. was in bull markets conditions, see; Sebehela T (2012). Exchange Options Hedging, IUP Journal of 
Financial Risk Management, IX(1), 55-63. 
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4.  Main Results 
 
The results are presented as follows; (i) implied options and prices, (ii) risks and (iii) (excess) 
returns. This is to make the presentation as elegantly as possible. To strengthen the results, this 
study calculates chi-test for options and z-test on risks and (excess) for (0;-32) window. The 
reason why this study uses a chi-test is because options are truncated and non-linear in 
distribution. 
 
4.1  Implied Options and Prices 
Table 2 illustrates implied options and prices when target firms were taken over by acquiring 
firms. 
 
[ INSERT TABLE 2 HERE ] 
 
The initial implied put options range from 0.00 to $43.97 and in Bhagat et al. 1987 they ranged 
between $0.01 and $9.77. Sorwar and Sudarsanam (2010) did not show the range of implied put 
options. The zero options values might have been executed for strategic reasons, possibly future 
synergies. The initial put value over pre-offer price is $0.37 on average and statistically 
insignificant, and for Bhagat et al. $6.25, its significance is not indicated. Similarly, Yilmaz and 
Tanyeri (2016), Kinateder et al. 2017 and Yaghoubi et al. 2016a and 2016b found that merger 
generates value for shareholders. While Yilmaz and Tanyeri (2016), and Kinateder et al. 2017 
illustrate most of benefits accrue to target shareholders, Yaghoubi et al. 2016a and 2016b show 
that mergers have a wavy pattern, i.e. benefits depend on the industry type and economic activity 
among other parameters. On the M&A premium, this study finds that on average, target firms 
are paid M&A premium, $5.05 and statistically insignificant. M&A premiums for Sorwar and 
Sudarsanam (2010) are £0.26 and £0.28 for entire and continuous samples respectively and both 
M&A premiums are statistically significant. And for Bhagat et al. 1987 it is $2.71, its significance 
is not indicated.  
 
The apparent premium (i.e. offer price over underlying stock price after offer is made) is $13.71. 
That is, on average target REIT firms get $13.71 apparent premium from acquirers. The apparent 
premiums in Sorwar and Sudarsanam (2010) are £0.34 and £0.37 for entire and continuous 
samples respectively and they are both statistically insignificant. In Bhagat et al. 1987 apparent 
premium is $1.1114 and the significance level is not indicated. Yilmaz and Tanyeri (2016) found 
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that more (less) premium goes to target (acquiring) shareholders. While Yaghoubi et al. 2016a 
found premium is caused by either valuation error or hubris. Valuation error is applicable to the 
study as real estate appraisers are all to some level to misprice properties. Hubris is most likely 
not to apply as REIT mergers are friendly in nature (see Womack 2012). Yaghoubi et al. 2016b 
show that managers whose compensation is equity based, pay less premium. Yilmaz and Tanyeri 
(2016), Kinateder et al. 2017 and Yaghoubi et al. 2016a and 2016b argue that mergers are 
characterized by synergies. For this study, the average exercise price for 21 M&A deals is $20.54 
and synergies are $15.51. Synergies as a proportion of exercise price are 30%. The reason why 
synergies seem a bit “high” is because when a put option is preceded by call option, and options 
have the same time to expiration and underlying asset, options tend to be additive. Trigeorgis 
(1993) echoed similar view. Furthermore, it implies that exercise regions of individual options do 
not overlap. Furthermore, Trigeorgis (1993) stated that the subsequent option increases the value 
of underlying asset for prior options substantially.  
 
More, this study adopts convergences8, and 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑉𝑢−𝑐 (𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑉𝑐−0) is -0.14 (−0.08 ) and they are 
statistically insignificant. The reason for non-convergence is possibly due to the risk premium in 
the REIT industry. Generally, prices converge when there is a strong efficient market hypothesis, 
which is not in the case of REITs. The 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑉𝑐−0 in Sorwar and Sudarsanam (2010) is 0.06 and 
statistically significant because they used mainly financial data. Overall, the model in this 
empirical study estimates 54% (21 out of 39 M&A deals) of implied put options. Bhagat et al. 
1987, and Sorwar and Sudarsanam (2010) estimate 9.41% (8 out of 85) and 24.53% (28 out of 
115) respectively. In addition, this empirical study explores what drives implied put options and 
the independent variables. The latter statement is tested based on the log-linear model. The 
independent variables are as follows; complete (dummy 1 for completed and 0 for withdrawn) 
and agreed (dummy 1 for agreed and 0 otherwise). Hostile offers variable is excluded as there are 
no such offers in this empirical study. Other independent variables are length (offer period in 
days), 1996-00 (dummy 1 for 1996-00 and 0 otherwise) and 2001-04 (dummy 1 for 2001-04 and 0 
otherwise). 1990-1995 variable is excluded as M&A deals start in 1996 in this empirical study. 
Sorwar and Sudarsanam (2010) had 1990-1995 variable. It is expected that implied put options 
are positive functions of length, 1996-00 (UPREIT was introduced in 1994) and 2001-04 (most 
REIT mergers started early 2000s, especially large ones). Sorwar and Sudarsanam (2010) echoed 
similar views on length and 1996-00 in relation to implied put options. 
 
                                                          
8 Convergences from Sorwar and Sudarsanam (2010) 
 17 
[ INSERT TABLE 3 HERE ] 
 
Table 3 illustrates that implied put options are positively related to length, 1996-00 and 2001-04 
as per prior expectations. A positive relation between implied put options and 1996-00 and 2001-
04 is illustrated by Sorwar and Sudarsanam (2010). In addition, this positive relationship is 
consistent with option pricing theory. The statistical significance of 1996-00 and 2001-04 can be 
attributed to earlier reasons. The length is statistically significant only at the 15th and 16th day 
post-M&A announcement. This might be two points where implied put options are maximised 
because every independent variable is statistically significant. The White tests illustrate that there 
is no heteroscedasticity in all models and there is no autocorrelation as Durban-Watson ranges 
acceptable range (i.e. 1.5 to 2.5). F-statistics show that there are structural breaks in all models. 
This is due to the fact that small size is indeed small (i.e. 21 M&A deals) and analysis is based on 
cross sectional data. On the other hand, the White test, Durban-Watson, F-stat, Akaike, Schwarz, 
Hannan-Quinn illustrates that results are robust. Thereafter, risks measures are explored. 
 
4.2  Risks 
In measuring risks, this article is focused on disaggregating risks patterns as opposed to finding 
the actual risk at that point in time. For the (0;-32) window, the standard deviation for target 
firms is implied one while for the acquiring firm is the actual standard deviation. That is, standard 
deviations for target firms do not include synergies while acquirers’ standard deviations include 
synergies. In addition, beta dynamics are explored. Table 4 illustrates the main risk measures (beta 
and standard deviation). 
 
[ INSERT TABLE 4 HERE ] 
 
Panel A shows that risks were lower post-M&A announcement than pre-M&A announcement 
probably due to the presence of synergies. The low betas for SPX and SPX small-cap imply that 
REITs act more like defensive stocks. The latter statement is consistent with the view that REITs 
exhibit small-cap and mid-cap characteristics. Moreover, results exemplify that REIT returns are 
“limited” as their betas are less than one in absolute terms. That is, REITs offer diversification 
benefits because their betas are negative (i.e. betas move in opposite direction to the markets). 
Another reason why U.S. REITs are different is that they are mainly focused. Even though 
REITs can diversify geographically, the amount of debt taken by REITs limits the benefits that 
come with geographical diversification. Campbell et al. 2001 illustrated that the geographical 
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diversification dummy is statistically insignificant and Anderson et al. 2009 stated that specialised 
REITs trade at a premium to diversified REITs. 
 
On the other hand, one can see that betas and standard deviations of acquiring firms are less than 
that of target firms. This confirms that that most of the risks are inherent in target firms than 
acquiring ones. Therefore, the latter statement partly explains why shareholders of target firms 
are compensated more than acquirers in mergers. Another thing that causes shareholders of 
target firms to be “overcompensated” is that during M&A, shareholders forego dividends payout 
until the merger is completed. Therefore, shareholders of target firms might want to recover the 
“lost” compensation in the future. Similar views hold on standard deviations. Decrease in 
uncertainty post-M&A announcement also lowers standard deviations. It should be borne in 
mind that negative betas are problematic for Treynor ratios as dividing by negative number 
changes the final calculation. Anderson et al. 2009 echoed similar views. The pre-M&A 
announcement skewness when the representative market is the SPX show that betas of acquiring 
firm are positively skewed while of target firms are negatively skewed. However, post-M&A 
announcement betas of acquiring firms are negatively skewed while of target firms are positively 
skewed. The latter statement supports the notion that risks decreased as distribution curves 
moved into opposite directions. The reduction in risks might be due to synergies. When the 
representative market is the SPX small-cap, there are hardly in changes when one compares pre-
and post-M&A announcement. This is probably because the constituents of the SPX small-cap 
have similar traits to REITs. 
 
On the betas dynamics, Panel B in Table 4 illustrates that betas changes pre- and post-M&A 
announcement are statistically significant. Thus, pre- and post-M&A announcement risks are 
different in the sense that they tend to be smaller post-M&A announcement when compared 
with the pre-M&A announcement. Just like Sorwar and Sudarsanam (2010), this empirical study 
explores how ACQSZ, ANNRET, MKTRET and RUNUP affect betas 1 and 2. The B/M is 
excluded because SNL Financial has only the latest ones. In addition, the acquisition rates of 
ordinary outstanding shares of target firms for cash-financed deals are 100%. Therefore, PCACQ 
is perfectly collinear with other independent variables. Hence, PCACQ is excluded from this 
analysis. The results in Panel C of Table 4 show that the RUNUP is negative and statistically 
significant because the acquirer is risky. ANNRET is positive and statistically significant; this 
might be due to information asymmetry embedded in the REIT industry. RELRISK for beta 1 is 
positive and statistically significant. This might be due to the same reasons as in ANNRET 
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because there is a positive relationship between returns and risks in most securities. Durban-
Watson illustrates that there is no autocorrelation in betas 1 and 2, and the White tests show that 
there is no heteroscedasticity in betas 1 and 2. There are structural breaks in betas 1 and 2 
because the data is cross sectional one. 
 
4.3  (Excess) Returns 
The (0;-10) window is representative of the REIT industry CARs given that stock prices of REIT 
firms are stable when compared with other industries. At the same time, this article calculates 
CARs for (+1;-1) is standard to illustrate CARs for that window. The expected returns are 
illustrated by CAPMs. Table 5 illustrates (excess) returns. 
 
[ INSERT TABLE 5 HERE ] 
 
CAPMs illustrate that expected returns are higher post-M&A announcement when compared 
with the ones of pre-M&A announcement. In addition, expected returns are statistically 
significant. The increase in expected returns post-M&A announcement probably symbolises the 
presence of synergies among other things. The CARs for (+1;-1) are all statistically significant. 
This illustrates that during that window, REIT acquisitions generate returns for shareholders. 
CARs for (+1;-1) in Yilmaz and Tanyeri (2016), Kinateder et al. 2017 and Yaghoubi et al. 2016a 
and 2016b are statistically significant. More, Yaghoubi et al. 2016a and 2016b show that the 
abnormal performance in mergers is statistically significant. The statistical significance of 
differences in means might be interpreted as illustrating that contributions of acquirers and target 
firms to the merged entity are different. The z-test illustrates that CARs of acquirers and target 
firms over the same period are indifferent. This might be interpreted as REIT acquisitions hardly 
generate alpha. To verify whether REIT acquisitions hardly generate alpha, common used alpha 
(i.e. Jensen, Sharpe, SIM and Treynor) ratios are calculated. Table 6 reports alphas of acquiring 
and target firms. 
 
[ INSERT TABLE 6 HERE ] 
 
There is no specific distributional pattern coming out of the Sharpe ratios, but post-M&A 
announcement Sharpe ratios are higher than pre-M&A announcement. However, the Sharpe 
ratios are statistically insignificant. The small Sharpe ratios coefficients might be interpreted as 
abnormal returns being “minimal” if they exist. The Treynor ratios illustrate similar pattern as the 
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Sharpe ratios and some the Treynor ratios should be read with caution because of the problem of 
negative betas. Given that REITs are highly institutionalised and focused products, the calibre of 
management has influence on REITs performance. Jensen ratios illustrate that there are no 
alphas in REIT M&A. This might be due the fact that hostile mergers are uncommon in the 
REIT industry although M&A benefits are unequally distributed. The SIM ratios illustrate that 
the excess returns (ERs) on stocks and markets are equal, which might be interpreted as no one is 
advantaged than other party in REIT mergers. The statistical significance of some alphas might 
due to some stocks jumps when mergers are announced. 
 
 
5.  Conclusion 
 
First, this article calculates implied volatilities of exchange options. Thereafter, implied exchange 
options are calculated based on implied volatilities. The volatility smiles of implied exchange 
options illustrate that there are arbitrage opportunities which symbolise the presence of synergies. 
Partly, those synergies illustrate that the option premiums emanating from emergence of 
exchange options. Thirdly, implied option values are driven by numerous economic parameters. 
The economic parameters in Table 3 for the 16th implied option is all statistically significant, this 
might be interpreted that implied options are maximised at the 16th implied option equations. The 
latter point is future research. Forth, the risk and return patterns exemplify phenomenon 
consistent with synergies presence. Thus, risks decrease post M&A while returns increase during 
the same period. Finally, just like other capital mergers, REIT mergers generate statistically 
significant alpha. 
 
The implications of this study are as follows: traders can use volatility smiles strategies to exploit 
REIT mergers. The latter strategy is commonly used in risk arbitrage strategies. Secondly, REIT 
mergers benefit both target and acquiring shareholders although benefits are inequitably 
distributed. Thirdly, REIT options can be used for hedging by larger REIT firms, especially 
mortgage ones. Finally, although leverage gives REIT firms first-mover advantage, leverage does 
not necessarily add value given stringent conditions attached to debt funding. 
 
  
 21 
References 
 
Anderson RI, Benefield JD and Zumpano LV (2009). Performance Differences in Property-Type 
Diversified Versus Specialized Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs). Review of Financial 
Economics, 18 (2): 70-79. 
Barraclough K, Robinson DT, Smith T and Whaley RE (2013). Using Option Prices to Infer 
Overpayments and Synergies in M&A Transactions. Review of Financial Studies, 26 (3): 695-
722. 
Bayer C, Friz P and Gatheral J (2016). Pricing Under Rough Volatility. Mathematical Finance, 16(6), 
887-904. 
Bhagat S, Brickley JA and Loewenstein U (1987). The Pricing Effects of Interfirm Cash Tender 
Offers. Journal of Finance, 42 (4): 965-986. 
Black F and Scholes M (1973). The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities. Journal of Political 
Economy, 81 (3): 637-654. 
Campbell JY, Lettau M, Malkiel BG and Xu Y (2001). Have Individual Stocks Become More 
Volatile? An Empirical Exploration of Idiosyncratic Risk. Journal of Finance, 56(1), 1-43. 
Case B, Yang Y and Yildirim Y (2012). Dynamic Correlations Among Asset Classes: REIT and 
Stock Returns. Journal of Real Estate Finance & Economics, 44(3), 298-318. 
Chi T and McGuire DJ (1996). Collaborative Ventures and Value of Learning: Integrating the 
Transaction Cost and Strategic Option Perspectives on the Choice of Market Entry Modes. 
Journal of International Business Studies, 27 (2): 285-307. 
Cont R and Kokholm T. (2013). A Consistent Pricing Model for Index Option and Volatility 
Derivatives. Mathematical Finance, 23(2), 248-274. 
Dann LY, Masulis RW and Mayers D (1991). Repurchase Tender Offers and Earnings 
Information. Journal of Accounting & Economics, 14 (3): 217-251. 
Glascock JL and Hung S-YK (2010). Volatilities and Momentum Returns in Real Estate 
Investment Trust. Journal Real Estate Finance & Economics, 41 (2): 126-149. 
Gonçalves S and Guildolin M (2006). Predictable Dynamics in the S&P500 Index Options 
Implied Volatility Surface. Journal of Business, 79(3), 1591-1635. 
Graham JR (1996). Debt and the Marginal Tax Rate. Journal of Financial Economics, 41 (1): 41-73. 
 22 
Grullon G, Lyandres E and Zhdanov A (2012). Real Options, Volatility, and Stock Returns. 
Journal of Finance, LVII (4): 1499-1537. 
Hackbarth D and Morellec E (2008). Stock Returns in Mergers and Acquisitions. Journal of 
Finance, LXIII (3): 1213-1252. 
Hobson DG and Rogers LCG (1998). Complete Models with Stochastic Volatility. Mathematical 
Finance, 8(1), 27-48. 
Jones CS (2003). The Dynamics of Stochastic Volatility: Evidence from Underlying and Options 
Markets. Journal of Econometrics, 116 (1-2), 181-224. 
Kinateder H, Fabich M, and Wagner N (2017). Domestic Merger and Acquisitions in BRICS 
Countries: Acquirers and Targets. Emerging Market Review, 32, 190-199. 
Sebehela T (2015). Exchange Options in the REIT Industry. Ph.D. Thesis, University of Reading, 
UK. 
Sorwar G and Sudarsanam S (2010). Determinants of Takeover Premium in Cash Offers: An 
Option Pricing Approach. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 37 (5/6): 687-714. 
Subramanian A (2004). Option Pricing on Stocks in Mergers and Acquisitions. Journal of Finance, 
LIX (2): 795-829. 
Trigeorgis L (1993). The Nature of Option Interactions and the Valuation of Investments with 
Multiple Real Options. Journal of Quantitative & Financial Analysis, 28 (1): 1-20. 
Womack, KS (2012). Real Estate Mergers: Corporate Control and Shareholder Wealth. Journal of 
Real Estate Finance & Economics, 44(4), 446–471. 
Yaghoubi R, Yaghoubi M, Locke S and Gibb J (2016a). Mergers and acquisitions: A Review. Part 
1, Studies in Economics and Finance, 33(1), 147–188. 
Yaghoubi R, Yaghoubi M, Locke S and Gibb J (2016b). Mergers and acquisitions: A Review. Part 
2, Studies in Economics and Finance, 33(1), 437–464. 
Yilmaz IS and Tanyeri B (2016). Global Marger and Acquisition (M&A) Activity: 1992-2011. 
Finance Research Letters, 17, 110-117. 
  
 23 
Table 1: Cash-Financed REIT Acquisitions Amounts during 1996-2009 Period 
Year 
$ million 
N. 
Mean Median Min Max Std Dev 
Panel A: Sample Distribution by Year 
1996 301.20 301.20 301.20 301.20 0.00 1 
1997 204.50 204.50 130.00 279.00 105.36 2 
1998 54.52 54.52 52.58 56.45 2.74 2 
1999 105.00 105.00 105.00 105.00 0.00 1 
2000 794.16 596.40 214.50 1,571.57 699.82 3 
2001 1,411.10 1,411.10 1,411.10 1,411.10 0.00 1 
2002 525.30 525.30 525.30 525.30 0.00 1 
2003 492.00 382.30 102.60 991.10 454.29 3 
2004 4,628.10 4,628.10 2,039.90 7,216.30 3,660.27 2 
2005 1,424.37 1,292.91 446.40 3,141.90 917.12 6 
2006 3,375.38 1,027.65 224.70 24,472.70 7,459.29 10 
2007 4,866.75 1,568.20 435.00 20,546.10 7,033.38 7 
2008 239.62 239.62 239.62 239.62 0.00 1 
2009 75.30 75.30 75.30 75.30 0.00 1 
Total Deals 
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Panel B: Sample Distribution by Period 
1996-1999 154.04 117.50 52.58 301.20 109.61 6 
2000-2009 2,798.25 1,140.45 75.30 24,472.70 5,398.14 35 
Total Deals 
     
41 
 
Note: On average, Table 1 illustrates that most deals are small-caps to mid-caps based on 
definition from Mueller (1998). Moreover, most cash financed deals were executed in the 2000s, 
especially around mid-2000s (i.e. bull markets phase) because GARCH (1;1) illustrates that spot 
volatilities converge to their long-term average volatilities from the top. N.: is sample size. 
  
Table 2: Implied Put Options and Stock Prices 
Measure Mean Median Min Max Std Dev Kurtosis Skewness N.: Chi-test 
Initial Put Value (0;-1) ($) 4.96 0.99 0.00 43.97 11.03 9.35 3.04 21 
3.18* 
(0.0745) 
Initial Put Value over Pre-Offer Price ($) 0.37 0.06 0.00 1.72 0.54 0.69 1.38 21 
0.26 
(0.6101) 
Put Value/Pre-Offer Price (%) 0.11 0.06 0.00 0.30 0.11 -1.05 0.70 21 
0.02 
(0.8875) 
Put Value/Underlying Stock Value (%) 0.07 0.03 0.00 0.30 0.08 3.50 1.65 21 
0.02 
(0.8875) 
Synergies ($) 15.51 15.49 15.42 15.69 0.09 -0.68 0.15 21 
0.00 
(1.0000) 
Synergies/Exercise Price (%) 0.30 0.30 0.29 0.31 0.00 -0.67 -0.15 21 
0.00 
(1.000) 
Measure Mean Median Min Max Std Dev Kurt Skew N.: Z-test 
Offer Price minus underlying Stock Price 
(after Offer is made) ($) 
5.05 1.47 0.30 44.09 10.59 11.18 3.28 21 
0.77 
(0.2794) 
Offer Price over underlying stock Price 
(after Offer is made) ($) 
13.79 0.04 -0.15 99.29 32.50 3.02 2.13 21 
0.97 
(0.3340) 
Exercise Price (all deals) 20.54 20.54 20.54 20.54 0.00 -0.56 0.06 21 
0.00*** 
(0.0000) 
𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑉𝑢−𝑐 -0.14 -0.13 -0.43 0.03 0.09 5.17 -1.68 21 
-0.19 
(0.1141) 
𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑉𝑐−0 -0.08 -0.03 -0.43 0.03 0.11 3.90 -1.85 21 
-0.95 
(0.3289) 
Note: From the final sample of 41 M&A deals, 2 deals were taken off because target firms had prices less than 32 days post M&A announcement 
although their time to expirations are more than 32 days post M&A announcement. Then, on the remaining 39 M&A deals, we calculated implied 
options for only 21 M&A deals as there is convergence problem on other M&A deals. Put value is the first put value after M&A announcement. 
Mean, Median, Min, Max, Std Dev, Kurt and Skew are averages of samples; ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. For the 
Chi-Test column, in each cell, the first number is Chi-stat and one in the bracket is the probability of the Chi-stat. Bhagat et al. 1987, and Sorwar and 
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Sudarsanam (2010) calculated implied options for (0;-21) window but we used (0;-32) window as the shortest time to expiration for one M&A deal is 
32-days post M&A announcement and we used the same window throughout the entire sample for consistence reasons when comparing different 
parameters. The reason why we use Chi-test for options related parameters is because options are truncated, and their payoffs are non-linear. We 
assume that exercise prices represent values of target firms as acquiring firm did valuations (i.e. exercise prices) on target before acquisitions. Sorwar 
and Sudarsanam (2010) did not state on how they determined underlying assets values. In deals were options amounts are zeros, those deals shouldn’t 
have been executed and in cases were options are more than zero, predators shouldn’t pay more than options amounts; otherwise, there is 
overpayment, possibly due to synergies. Hence, synergies are the differences of exercise and options prices. Chi and McGuire (1996) stated similar 
illustration for synergies. For the z-test, we test the difference between the mean and median because the median gives a picture about where are our 
most values concentrated while mean gives as averages of distribution. Sorwar and Sudarsanam (2010) followed the same principle on their t-test. 
Bhagat et al. 1987 did not do any test on their options. For price related parameters we use z-test because we calculated options for (0;-32) window for 
each M&A deal. Converges (CONVs) are adopted from Sorwar and Sudarsanam (2010), 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑉𝑢−𝑐 = (𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑉𝑢 − 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑉𝑐) 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑉𝑐⁄  measures 
convergence of underlying target stock value, 𝑉𝑢, towards the closing target stock price 𝑉𝑐 on the final period of the offer period and 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑉𝑐−0 =
(𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑉𝑐 − 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑉0) 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑉0⁄  measures the convergence of closing stock price, 𝑉𝑐, to the offer price, 𝑉0. N.: is sample size. 
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Table 3: Estimated Put Value Regressions on Explanatory Variables (IO=Implied Option) 
Model Const Length 1996-00 2001-04 Adj R2 
White 
Test 
Durbin-
Watson 
F-Stat Akaike Schwarz 
Hannan-
Quinn 
N. 
IO 1 
-2.4538 
(0.2366) 
0.5305 
(0.2117) 
1.7355*** 
(0.0005) 
0.6621 
(0.1042) 
20.54% 
2.2990 
(0.8903) 
1.55 
2.7237* 
(0.0766) 
3.11 3.30 3.15 21 
IO 2 
-2.4506 
(0.2371) 
0.5299 
(0.2121) 
1.7354*** 
(0.0005) 
0.6619 
(0.1042) 
20.53% 
2.2995 
(0.8902) 
1.54 
2.7233* 
(0.0766) 
3.11 3.30 3.14 21 
IO 3 
-2.6424 
(0.1735) 
0.5669 
(0.1527) 
1.7411*** 
(0.0005) 
0.6832* 
(0.0886) 
20.88% 
2.3996 
(0.8795) 
1.57 
2.7569* 
(0.0743) 
3.09 3.29 3.13 21 
IO 4 
-2.5902 
(0.1830) 
0.5585 
(0.1613) 
1.7395*** 
(0.0005) 
0.6895* 
(0.0852) 
20.70% 
2.4104 
(0.8784) 
1.56 
2.7405* 
(0.0754) 
3.08 3.28 3.13 21 
IO 5 
-2.5879 
(0.1832) 
0.5581 
(0.1614) 
1.7393*** 
(0.0005) 
0.6895* 
(0.0851) 
20.69% 
2.4117 
(0.8782) 
1.56 
2.7400* 
(0.0754) 
3.08 3.28 3.13 21 
IO 6 
-2.8909 
(0.1345) 
0.6201 
(0.1175) 
1.7483*** 
(0.0005) 
0.7451* 
(0.0623) 
20.48% 
2.5241 
(0.8658) 
1.58 
2.7173* 
(0.770) 
3.08 3.27 3.12 21 
IO 7 
-2.9284 
(0.1299) 
0.6278 
(0.1134) 
1.7493*** 
(0.0005) 
0.7524* 
(0.0613) 
20.43% 
2.5418 
(0.8638) 
1.58 
2.7118* 
(0.0774) 
3.08 3.27 3.12 21 
IO 8  
-2.8685 
(0.1383) 
0.6157 
(0.1209) 
1.7474*** 
(0.0005) 
0.7621* 
(0.0572) 
20.26% 
2.5570 
(0.8620) 
1.57 
2.6940* 
(0.0787) 
3.07 3.27 3.11 21 
IO 9  
-2.867 
(0.1383) 
0.6154 
(0.1208) 
1.7473*** 
(0.0005) 
0.7624* 
(0.0570) 
20.25% 
2.5588 
(0.8618) 
1.57 
2.6933* 
(0.0847) 
3.07 3.27 3.11 21 
IO 10 
-2.8222 
(0.1479) 
0.6066 
(0.1295) 
1.7372*** 
(0.0006) 
0.7623* 
(0.0568) 
19.49% 
2.6105 
(0.8559) 
1.56 
2.6146* 
(0.0847) 
3.07 3.29 3.13 21 
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IO 11 
-2.8206 
(0.1479) 
0.6060 
(0.1295) 
1.7370*** 
(0.0006) 
0.7626* 
(0.0567) 
19.48% 
2.6125 
(0.8557) 
1.56 
2.6136* 
(0.0848) 
3.09 3.28 3.13 21 
IO 12 
-2.9189 
(0.1264) 
0.6262 
(0.1100) 
1.7597*** 
(0.0004) 
0.7642* 
(0.0566) 
21.19% 
2.5079 
(0.8676) 
1.58 
2.7933* 
(0.0718) 
3.05 3.25 3.10 21 
IO 13 
-2.9713 
(0.1189) 
0.6369 
(0.1033) 
1.7613*** 
(0.0004) 
0.7559* 
(0.0600) 
21.34% 
2.4978 
(0.8687) 
1.60 
2.8094* 
(0.0707) 
3.06 3.25 3.10 21 
IO 14 
-2.9703 
(0.1188) 
0.6368 
(0.1031) 
1.7612*** 
(0.0004) 
0.7563* 
(0.0538) 
21.35% 
2.4993 
(0.8685) 
1.60 
2.8092* 
(0.0708) 
3.06 3.25 3.10 21 
IO 15 
-3.0086 
(0.1147) 
0.6447* 
(0.0994) 
1.7623*** 
(0.0004) 
0.7637* 
(0.0579) 
21.29% 
2.5169 
(0.8666) 
1.60 
2.8034* 
(0.0712) 
3.06 3.26 3.10 21 
IO 16 
-3.0078 
(0.1145) 
0.6446* 
(0.0993) 
1.7622*** 
(0.0004) 
0.7639* 
(0.0577) 
21.28% 
2.5184 
(0.8664) 
1.60 
2.8032* 
(0.0712) 
3.06 3.25 3.10 21 
IO 17 
-2.9290 
(0.1331) 
0.6286 
(0.1161) 
1.7597*** 
(0.0004) 
0.7547* 
(0.0622) 
21.14% 
2.4822 
(0.8703) 
1.59 
2.7870* 
(0.0723) 
3.06 3.26 3.10 21 
IO 18 
-2.9747 
(0.1267) 
0.6360 
(0.1103) 
1.7610*** 
(0.0004) 
0.7474* 
(0.0625) 
21.26% 
2.4735 
(0.8714) 
1.60 
2.7999* 
(0.0714) 
3.07 3.27 3.11 21 
IO 19 
-2.9738 
(0.1266) 
0.6379 
(0.1102) 
1.7609*** 
(0.0004) 
0.7476* 
(0.0654) 
21.25% 
2.4767 
(0.8713) 
1.61 
2.7997* 
(0.0714) 
3.07 3.27 3.11 21 
IO 20 
-2.9578 
(0.1295) 
0.6347 
(0.1099) 
1.7603*** 
(0.0004) 
0.7354* 
(0.0709) 
21.31% 
2.4756* 
(0.08713) 
1.63 
2.8051* 
(0.0711) 
3.07 3.27 3.11 21 
IO 21 
-2.9569 
(0.1264) 
0.6346 
(0.1098) 
1.7602*** 
(0.0004) 
0.7355* 
(0.0708) 
21.30% 
2.8048* 
(0.0710) 
1.64 
2.8048* 
(0.0710) 
3.07 3.27 3.12 21 
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IO 22 
-2.8707 
(0.1413) 
0.6092 
(0.1281) 
1.7948*** 
(0.0003) 
0.7727* 
(0.0609) 
21.78% 
2.4494* 
(0.08741) 
1.64 
2.8565* 
(0.0678) 
3.07 3.27 3.12 21 
IO 23 
-2.8135 
(0.1513) 
0.5923 
(0.1419) 
1.8177*** 
(0.0003) 
0.7973* 
(0.0559) 
22.09% 
2.4259 
(0.8767) 
1.65 
2.8909* 
(0.0657) 
3.08 3.27 3.11 21 
IO 24 
-2.6401 
(0.1896) 
0.5608 
(0.1771) 
1.8119*** 
(0.0003) 
0.8232** 
(0.0469) 
21.49% 
2.4742 
(0.8713) 
1.65 
2.8252* 
(0.0698) 
3.07 3.26 3.11 21 
IO 25 
-2.6713 
(0.1754) 
0.5692 
(0.1591) 
1.7859*** 
(0.0004) 
0.7961* 
(0.0519) 
21.10% 
2.5032 
(0.8681) 
1.65 
2.7831* 
(0.0725) 
3.06 3.26 3.11 21 
IO 26 
-2.5343 
(0.2058) 
0.5475 
(0.1823) 
1.7180*** 
(0.0006) 
0.7563* 
(0.0630) 
18.29% 
2.7149 
(0.8437) 
1.63 
2.4925* 
(0.0949) 
3.10 3.30 3.15 21 
IO 27 
-2.5505 
(.1980) 
0.5577 
(0.1698) 
1.6932*** 
(0.0007) 
0.7101* 
(0.0783) 
18.44% 
2.6367 
(0.8529) 
1.62 
2.5072* 
(0.0936) 
3.09 3.29 3.14 21 
IO 28 
-2.6098 
(0.1875) 
0.5699 
(0.6105) 
1.6945*** 
(0.0007) 
0.7002* 
(0.0838) 
18.57% 
2.6241 
(0.88543) 
1.63 
2.5201* 
(0.0925) 
3.10 3.20 3.14 21 
IO 29 
-2.6283 
(0.1844) 
0.5738 
(0.1577) 
1.6946*** 
(0.0007) 
0.6968* 
(0.0856) 
18.60% 
2.6215 
(0.8546) 
1.64 
2.5229* 
(0.0923) 
3.11 3.30 3.15 21 
IO 30 
-2.5304 
(0.2002) 
0.5540 
(0.1715) 
1.6911*** 
(0.0007) 
0.6792* 
(0.0929) 
18.71% 
2.5795 
(0.8595) 
1.63 
2.5341* 
(0.0913) 
3.10 3.30 3.14 21 
IO 31 
-2.5559 
(0.1920) 
0.5593 
(0.1640) 
1.6914*** 
(0.0007) 
0.6599 
(0.1023) 
19.04% 
2.5436 
(0.8636) 
1.63 
2.5679* 
(0.0836) 
3.10 3.30 3.15 21 
IO 32 
-2.5013 
(0.2018) 
0.5482 
(0.1725) 
1.6892*** 
(0.0007) 
0.6503 
(0.1073) 
19.08% 
2.5245 
(0.8657) 
1.63 
2.5716* 
(0.0882) 
3.11 3.31 3.15 21 
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Note: A log-liner model is used, i.e.  𝑙𝑛(𝑌𝑡) = 𝐴 + 𝛽1𝑋1𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑋2𝑡 + 𝜇𝑡 because the dependent variable; implied options (IOs) are non-linear in 
distribution, 𝐴 is a constant (i.e. y intercept), 𝛽1 and 𝛽2 are estimated parameters, and 𝑋1𝑡 and 𝑋2𝑡 are independent variables, 𝜇𝑡 is the mean and𝑌𝑡 is 
dependent variable. Regressions are named after implied options values and each implied options regression represent options during a certain time 
for the (0;-32) window of 21 M&A deals. We used the same independent variables as Sorwar and Sudarsanam (2010); length is the offer period in days 
(the neutral log of days for the regression variable are taken), 1999-00 is period of dummy variable that equates to 1 for 1996-2000 and zero otherwise. 
For length Sorwar and Sudrasanam (2010) used offer period in years but in this case that definition made the length variable to have a contrary co-
efficient to OPT and expectations; hence, the length is “changed”. The 2001-2004 is the dummy variable that equates to 1 for 2001-2004 and 0 
otherwise. The first period, 1990-1995 is not part of these regressions as data starts from 1996. Complete (i.e. 1 for complete and 0 for withdrawn) and 
agreed (i.e. 1 for agreed and 0 for hostile) because the data is made up of all complete offers and we don’t have hostile offers. N.: is sample size. 
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Table 4: Risk Measures 
 
Panel A: Risk Illustration 
Measure Market Window Firm Mean Median Min Max Std Dev Kurtosis Skewness N. z-test  
Beta 
S&P 500 
(+150;0) 
Predator -0.001 -0.001 -0.044 0.045 0.019 1.022 0.018 41 
0.14* 
(0.0557) 
Prey -0.001 -0.001 -0.046 0.039 0.017 1.282 -0.279 41 
-0.16* 
(0.0636) 
(0;-32) 
Predator 0.000 0.000 -0.023 0.021 0.012 0.312 -0.060 41 
-0.07** 
(0.0279) 
Prey -0.006 -0.003 -0.048 0.029 0.017 3.139 -0.229 41 
-0.50 
(0.1915) 
S&P 600 
small-cap 
(+150;0) 
Predator 0.001 -0.019 -0.334 0.349 0.172 -0.185 0.019 41 
0.37 
(0.1406) 
Prey -0.219 -0.026 -1.145 0.402 0.461 -0.411 0.103 41 
-1.34 
(0.4099) 
(0;-32) 
Predator -0.013 -0.019 -0.204 0.158 0.105 -0.161 -0.101 41 
0.20* 
(0.0793) 
Prey 0.016 0.018 -0.208 0.244 0.123 0.943 0.129 41 
-0.04** 
(0.0160) 
Std Dev 
(+150;0) 
Predator 0.015 0.015 0.014 0.016 0.000 -0.178 0.154 41 
-0.30 
(0.1179) 
Prey 0.043 0.043 0.042 0.045 0.001 13.036 1.370 41 
0.15* 
(0.0539) 
(0;-32) 
Predator 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.016 0.000 0.092 0.043 41 
0.80 
(0.2881) 
Prey 0.036 0.006 0.001 0.177 0.060 1.041 1.624 21 
1.14 
(0.3729) 
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Panel B: Beta Dynamics of Acquirers and Target Firms 
 
Measure Market Window Firm Mean Median Min Max Std Dev Kurtosis Skewness N. z-test 
Beta 
S&P 500 
(+150;0) Predator -0.001 -0.001 -0.044 0.045 0.019 1.022 0.018 41 
0.01*** 
(0.0004) 
(0;-32) Predator 0.000 0.000 -0.023 0.021 0.012 0.312 -0.060 41 
(+150;0) Prey -0.001 -0.001 -0.046 0.039 0.017 1.282 -0.279 41 
-0.06** 
(0.0239) 
(0;-32) Prey -0.006 -0.003 -0.048 0.029 0.017 3.139 -0.229 41 
S&P 600 
small-cap 
(150;0) Predator 0.001 -0.019 -0.338 0.349 0.172 -0.185 0.019 41 
-0.07** 
(0.0279) 
(0;-32) Predator -0.013 -0.019 -0.204 0.158 0.105 -0.161 -0.101 41 
(150;0) Prey -0.219 -0.219 -1.145 0.402 0.461 -0.411 0.103 41 
0.97 
(0.3340) 
(0;-32) Prey 0.016 0.018 -0.208 0.244 0.123 0.943 0.129 41 
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Panel C: Acquirer Beta Dynamics Surrounding Acquisitions 
Model Const Acqsiz Annret Dealsiz Mktret Relrisk Runup 
Adj 
R2 
White 
Test 
DW F-Stat AIC SIC HQ N. 
Beta 1 
-2.64 
(0.417) 
0.33 
(0.456) 
2.91*** 
(0.000) 
0.03 
(0.455) 
8.02 
(0.135) 
0.24** 
(0.030) 
-0.97*** 
(0.0000) 
0.98 
35.46 
(0.13) 
1.52 
421.47*** 
(0.000) 
1.24 1.53 1.34 41 
Beta 2  
-0.24 
(0.155) 
0.0043 
(0.827) 
2.93*** 
(0.000) 
0.02 
(0.561) 
-6.11 
(0.302) 
0.1933 
(0.110) 
-0.97*** 
(0.0000) 
0.98 
36.48 
(0.11) 
1.56 
407.06*** 
(0.000) 
1.27 1.56 1.37 41 
 
Note: D-W is Durban-Watson statistics, beta and std dev are calculated for 2 markets; S&P 500 and S&P 600 small-cap respectively. For prey for (0;-
32) window, Std Dev is calculated based on implied stock prices. The reason why there are 21 firms for the prey for (0;-32) window is because from 
the final sample of 41 M&A deals, 2 deals were taken off because target firms had prices less than 32 days post M&A announcement although their 
time to expirations are more than 32 days post M&A announcement. Then, on the remaining 39 M&A deals, we calculated implied options for only 21 
M&A deals as there is convergence problem on other M&A deals. On beta dynamics, principles of Sorwar and Sudarsanam (2010) are adopted, using 
a z-test (i.e. each window is 32 days post-M&A announcement) we test for mean difference of firms (i.e. acquiring and target firms) pre-and post-
M&A announcement. Just like Sorwar and Sudarsanam (2010), an ordinary least square (OLS) is used to determine what drives betas (change in 
acquirer’s beta surrounding bid announcement, i.e. beta over day +1 to completion date less beta over day -31 relative to announcement date, day 0) 
then the betas are modelled against the independent variables; RUNUP (is the change in acquirer’s beta in run to bid announcement, i.e. beta over -31 
to day -1 less the beta over -252 days relative to day 0), ANNRET (is 3 day announcement return), DEALSIZ (is the deal-to-market value ratio, i.e. 
ratio of deal size to acquirer market capitalisation 4 weeks prior to announcement), MKTRET is one year return to market portfolio (S&P 500 and 
S&P 600 small-cap respectively) prior to bid announcement, PCACQ is percentage of shares acquired. RELRISK is ratio of acquirers to target’s 
standard deviation of returns in a the1-year pre-offer period. ACQSIZ is market capitalisation of acquirer 2 weeks (4 weeks in case of Sorwar and 
Sudarsanam, 2010) prior to bid announcement. We didn’t include B/M (book-to-market ratio with market cap taken 4 weeks prior to announcement 
and book value of equity from most recent accounting statement prior to that date) as SNL Financial does not provide B/M but total non-depreciable 
real estate value for book value (NDBV) and market capitalisation but only have latest values on NDBV and market caps. Acquirers acquired 100% 
targets; hence, PCACQ variable is perfectly collinear with other variables. For that reason, the PCACQ is left out. The equations, Beta 1 and Beta 2 are 
when markets are S&P 500 and S&P 600 small-cap respectively. N.: is sample size and for each window, (+) indicates number of days before the event 
happens and (–) days after the event happened. 
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Table 5: (Excess) Returns 
Measure Market Window Firm Mean Median Min Max Std Dev Kurtosis Skewness N. z-test  
CAPM 
S&P500 
(+150;0) 
Predator 0.032 0.032 0.029 0.034 0.001 -0.133 -0.032 41 
0.00*** 
(0.0000) 
Prey 0.041 0.041 0.037 0.045 0.002 0.076 0.117 41 
0.06** 
(0.0239) 
(0;-32) 
Predator 0.032 0.032 0.031 0.034 0.001 0.045 -0.085 41 
0.07** 
(0.0279) 
Prey 0.043 0.043 0.040 0.046 0.001 1.300 0.190 41 
0.31 
(0.1217) 
S&P600 
small-cap 
(+150;0) 
Predator 0.034 0.035 0.018 0.052 0.008 0.052 0.027 41 
-0.32 
(0.1255) 
Prey 0.049 0.041 0.020 0.096 0.020 0.218 -0.012 41 
1.31 
(0.4032) 
(0;-32) 
Predator 0.035 0.035 0.025 0.045 0.005 0.198 0.014 41 
-0.25* 
(0.0987) 
Prey 0.042 0.042 0.030 0.054 0.006 0.021 -0.113 41 
0.03** 
(0.0120) 
CARs 
S&P500 (0;-10) 
Predator -0.001 -0.003 -0.028 0.026 0.017 -0.289 0.045 41 
0.22* 
(0.0871) 
Prey 0.101 0.120 0.005 0.151 0.055 1.031 -0.650 41 
-1.11 
(0.3643) 
S&P600 
small-cap 
(0;-10) 
Predator 0.078 0.002 -0.029 0.860 0.260 9.235 2.799 41 
0.94 
(0.3264) 
Prey 0.169 0.122 0.007 0.887 0.247 7.138 -0.575 41 
0.62 
(0.2324) 
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Measure Market Window Firm Mean Median Min Max Std Dev Kurtosis Skewness N. z-test  
CARs 
S&P500 (+1;-1) 
Predator 0.000 0.008 -0.001 0.098 0.011 0.013 0.008 41 
0.19* 
(0.0715) 
Prey 0.012 0.057 0.010 0.062 0.050 1.011 -0.598 41 
-2.10** 
(0.0179) 
S&P600 
small-cap 
(+1;-1) 
Predator 0.061 0.001 0.023 0.072 0.010 6.123 1.987 41 
0.25* 
(0.0987) 
Prey 0.0113 0.092 0.010 0.023 0.002 5.028 -0.348 41 
0.20* 
(0.0793) 
 
Note: The formula for CAPM is 𝐸(𝑅) = 𝑅𝑓 + 𝛽𝑖(𝑅𝑚 − 𝑅𝑓) and cumulative abnormal return (CAR) is the sum of all abnormal returns, where the 
abnormal return is the difference of actual and expected returns. N.: is sample size and for each window, (+) indicates number of days before the 
event happens and (–) days after the event happened. 
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Table 6: Alpha 
Measure Market Window Firm Mean Median Min Max Std Dev Kurtosis Skewness N. Z-test 
Sharpe 
S&P 500 
(+150;0) 
Predator 0.003 0.035 -0.292 0.248 0.087 2.787 -0.242 41 
-1.17 
(0.4564) 
Prey 0.042 0.017 -0.321 0.569 0.011 0.105 0.012 41 
7.23 
(0.9998) 
(0;-32) 
Predator 0.000 -0.012 -0.196 0.181 0.082 1.210 -0.045 41 
0.44 
(0.1700) 
Prey 0.139 0.004 -0.013 0.047 0.111 0.097 0.016 41 
3.92 
(0.9500) 
S&P 600  
small-cap 
(+150;0) 
Predator -2.060 -2.035 -0.047 0.021 0.077 3.363 -0.205 41 
-1.02 
(0.3461) 
Prey 0.043 0.019 -0.032 0.056 0.011 1.018 0.012 41 
7.13 
(0.9996) 
(0;-32) 
Predator -2.030 -2.044 -0.382 -0.043 0.072 1.433 -0.041 41 
0.64 
(0.2389) 
Prey 0.122 0.093 -0.012 0.047 0.011 9.712 1.638 41 
8.43 
(0.9999) 
Treynor 
S&P 500 
(+150;0) 
Predator -0.047 -0.104 -0.144 0.074 0.035 0.512 -0.018 41 
5.23 
(0.9912) 
Prey 0.000 0.000 -0.005 0.056 0.005 0.000 0.000 41 
0.21* 
(0.0832) 
(0;-32) 
Predator -1.502 -1.297 -1.541 0.223 0.108 6.106 -0.340 41 
-6.06 
(0.9976) 
Prey 0.005 -0.001 -0.057 0.213 0.046 0.011 0.000 41 
0.41 
(0.1591) 
S&P 600  
small-cap 
(+150;0) 
Predator -0.146 0.114 -0.100 0.068 0.109 0.065 0.018 41 
-7.63 
(0.9997) 
Prey 0.001 0.000 -0.038 0.041 0.059 0.066 0.008 41 
0.03** 
(0.0120) 
(0;-32) 
Predator -0.107 -0.121 -0.045 0.185 0.091 0.073 -0.008 41 
0.49 
(0.1879) 
Prey -0.085 -0.060 -2.356 1.711 0.681 10.342 -0.715 41 
-0.12** 
(0.0478) 
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Jensen 
S&P 500 
(+150;0) 
Predator -0.030 -0.030 -0.072 0.007 0.012 3.456 -0.168 41 
0.04** 
(0.0160) 
Prey -0.038 -0.040 -0.114 0.227 0.036 13.856 1.541 41 
0.26 
(0.1026) 
(0;-32) 
Predator -0.032 -0.032 -0.063 -0.007 0.012 1.392 -0.075 41 
0.08** 
(0.0319) 
Prey -0.040 -0.042 -0.058 0.044 0.018 14.082 1.858 41 
0.48 
(0.1844) 
S&P 600 
small-cap 
(+150;0) 
Predator -0.034 -0.034 -0.083 0.013 0.016 2.776 -0.097 41 
0.01*** 
(0.0040) 
Prey -0.037 -0.040 -0.114 0.228 0.036 13.303 1.480 41 
0.27 
(0.1064) 
(0;-32) 
Predator -0.035 -0.035 -0.070 -0.004 0.014 1.054 -0.029 41 
0.06** 
(0.0239) 
Prey -0.039 -0.042 -0.057 0.047 0.018 13.501 1.816 41 
0.49 
(0.1879) 
SIM-ERs 
on the 
stock 
S&P 500 
(+150;0) 
Predator -0.040 -0.040 -0.086 0.001 0.012 6.283 -0.219 41 
0.02*** 
(0.0080) 
Prey -0.038 -0.041 -0.114 0.227 0.036 13.879 1.540 41 
0.27 
(0.1064) 
(0;-32) 
Predator -0.042 -0.042 -0.076 -0.013 0.013 1.399 -0.018 41 
0.04** 
(0.0160) 
Prey -0.039 -0.042 -0.057 0.046 0.018 14.178 1.862 41 
0.51 
(0.1950) 
S&P 600  
small-cap 
(+150;0) 
Predator -0.040 -0.040 -0.086 0.001 0.012 6.283 -0.219 41 
0.02*** 
(0.0080) 
Prey -0.038 -0.041 -0.114 0.227 0.036 13.879 1.540 41 
0.27 
(0.1064) 
(0;-32) 
Predator -0.042 -0.042 -0.076 -0.013 0.013 1.399 -0.018 41 
0.04* 
(0.060) 
Prey -0.039 -0.042 -0.057 0.046 0.018 14.178 1.862 41 
0.51 
(0.1950) 
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Measure Market Window Firm Mean Median Min Max Std Dev Kurtosis Skewness N. Z-test 
SIM-ERs 
on the 
market 
S&P 500 
(+150;0) 
Predator -0.030 -0.030 -0.072 0.007 0.012 3.468 -0.169 41 
0.05** 
(0.0199) 
Prey -0.038 -0.041 -0.114 0.227 0.036 13.879 1.540 41 
0.27 
(0.1064) 
(0;-32) 
Predator -0.032 -0.032 -0.063 -0.007 0.012 1.406 -0.067 41 
0.09** 
(0.0359) 
Prey -0.039 -0.042 -0.057 0.046 0.018 14.178 1.862 41 
-0.20* 
(0.0793) 
S&P 600 
small-cap 
(+150;0) 
Predator -0.034 -0.034 -0.078 0.006 0.013 3.671 -0.159 41 
-0.02*** 
(0.0080) 
Prey -0.038 -0.041 -0.114 0.227 0.036 13.879 1.540 41 
0.27 
(0.1064) 
(0;-32) 
Predator -0.035 -0.035 -0.068 -0.006 0.013 1.476 -0.051 41 
0.05** 
(0.0199) 
Prey -0.039 -0.042 -0.057 0.046 0.018 14.178 1.862 41 
0.51 
(0.1950) 
 
Note: The Jensen formula; 𝛼𝑗 = 𝑅𝑖 − [𝑅𝑓 + 𝐵𝑖(𝑅𝑚 − 𝑅𝑓)], Sharpe; 𝑆 =
(𝑅𝑎−𝑅𝑏)
𝜎
, Treynor; 𝑇 =
(𝑅𝑖−𝑅𝑓)
𝛽𝑖
 and SIM; 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖(𝑅𝑚𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓) +
𝜀𝑖𝑡. 𝐸(𝑅) is the expected return, 𝑅𝑓 is the risk-free interest rate, 𝛽𝑖 is the portfolio beta, 𝑅𝑚 is market return, 𝑅𝑖 is the portfolio return, 𝑅𝑎 is the asset 
return, 𝑅𝑏 is the bench marking returns such as 𝑅𝑓 or index returns and 𝜎 is the standard deviation, 𝑟𝑖𝑡 is return to stock 𝑖 in period 𝑡, 𝑟𝑓 is the risk-
free interest rate, 𝑟𝑚𝑡 is the return to the market portfolio in period 𝑡, 𝛼𝑖 is the stock’s alpha, or abnormal return, 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓is the ER on the stock, 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝑚𝑡 is the ER on the market, 𝛽𝑖is the stock’s beta (or responsiveness to the market return) and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the residual (random) return, which is 
assumed normally distributed with mean zero and standard deviation 𝜎𝑖. N.: is sample size and for each window, (+) indicates number of days before 
the event happens and (–) days after the event happened. 
 
